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Comments
UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT
IN MISSOURI
I.

INTRODUCrION

In 1950 the National Conference on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. It was designed to enable a dependent in one state to secure money for support from a person who is legally liable
for the support of the dependent, but who is residing in another state. The act
proved to be basically sound and has been such a valuable mechanism for enforcing
the duty of support that today every state and territory of the nation has adopted
the act or one substantially similar.
Missouri adopted the act,' as originally drafted, in 1951. Continued study by
the National Conference resulted in recommended revisions which have been incorporated, for the most part, into the act by the Missouri General Assembly.
Although the act is basically sound, courts have found problems either in construing its provisions or in reconciling it with already existing state law. Some
of these problems and the manner in which different courts have disposed of them
are here presented.
A basic understanding of the procedure is necessary to evaluate fairly the
solutions suggested. As an example, suppose husband, H, goes to Texas, leaving
wife, W, and child, C, without any means of support in Missouri, but fully intending to send money regularly. Once in Texas H sends a few checks for small
amounts, but he soon finds other uses for his money, and W and C are left unprovided for. W investigates, and discovers H is living in Dallas and has a good job.
W may then file a petition in the local Missouri circuit court alleging that H
owes her and C a duty of support and that H is now residing in a certain county
in Texas. The Missouri court considers the petition and determines that H probably does owe W and C a duty of support. The petition is certified and sent, along
with a copy of the Missouri act, to the appropriate Texas court. Upon receipt of
the petition, the Texas court takes the necessary steps to obtain jurisdiction of H
or his property, holds a hearing, and if it finds that a duty of support does exist
it will order H to furnish the support. A copy of the order is sent back to the
Missouri court. To enforce the order, the Texas court may require H to furnish
bond, or more likely, to make periodic payments to the court, which will transmit
the payments to the Missouri court, which, in turn, will forward them to W and C.

1.

454.010-.360, RSMo 1959.
(481)
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CIVIL ENFORCEMENT

The Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act is primarily a civil proceeding,
but to retain the threat of extradition over one who would avoid the civil provisions of the act, criminal provisions were included. 2 It would seem that the criminal
portion does not violate the constitutional requirement of confrontation in criminal
cases because in an enforcement of this section the defendant will be extradited
to complainant's jurisdiction where he will be confronted with the witnesses
against him.3
A. Constitutionality
There are several areas, however, in which the constitutionality of the civil
portion of the act might be challenged.
The first of these areas stems from the constitutional provision that "no state
shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any agreement or compact
with another state . . . .". At least one writer has concluded that even if this act
should be construed as an "implied" compact, the constitutional provision is generally held to require congressional consent only when the subject matter of the
act either increases or decreases the political power expressly granted to Congress.5
Thus, the agreements and compacts that violate the constitution are those effecting the "just supremacy of the United States . . . or its political integrity . . . or
interference with sovereign treaty making powers and other situations not pertinent
here."0 This was the approach taken by our court in Ivey v. Ayers.7 It was there
said:
There is nothing in the Missouri Act which requires or contemplates
an agreement or compact with another state, and insofar as the Act is concerned no agreement or compact has ever been entered into. Missouri has
never agreed with any other state what the duties of the defendant should
be as to the support of his dependents, and she is free to repeal the Act
at any time. There is no "formation of any combination tending to the
increase of political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States," which condition
has been held to be essential to an agreement or compact requiring the
consent of Congress.

2. §§ 454.050-.060, RSMo 1959.
3. Freeman v. Freeman, 226 La. 410, 76 So. 2d 414 (1954); Commonwealth
ex rel. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 175 Pa. Super. 100, 103 A.2d 430 (1954). These cases also
point out that the act is primarily a civil proceeding, in which no right of confrontation exists.
4. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
5. Brockelbank, Is the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
Constitutional?,17 Mo. L. REv. 1, 3 (1952).
6. Landes v. Landes, 1 N.Y.2d 358, 135 N.E.2d 562, appeal dismissed, 352
U.S. 948 (1956).
7. 301 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. 1957). See also Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of the States Wit&. One Another and With ForeignPowers, 2 MINN. L. Ray.
518 (1918).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/8
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Assuming that the Missouri Act constitutes a compact with
another state, it does not increase or decrease political power, and therefore
it is not void but at most voidable. There has been no objection from Congress, and we do not anticipate that there will be.8
Furthermore, the consent of Congress to agreements between states usually
may be inferred from silence and acquiescence. The best answer, however, would
seem to be that the act is not a compact between the states enacting it. There is
no agreement and no part of the text can be construed as offering or agreeing to
do anything.9
The second ground on which the act might be challenged is that a state legislature may not delegate its law making authority. The act as finally adopted in
1951 provided:
Duties of support enforceable under this chapter are those imposed
or imposable under the laws of any state where the alleged obligor was
present during the period for which support is sought or where the obligee
was present when the failure to support commenced, at the election of
the obligee. 10
Although never litigated in this state, it was arguable that the provisions of sections 454.040 and 454.07011 which together created a duty of support under the
laws of the state where the obligee was present when the failure to support commenced, was a delegation of legislative power to the legislature of the other state.
Whatever the validity of this possible objection, the General Assembly settled
the problem in 1959 by limiting the duty of support to that imposable under the
laws of the state where the obligor was present during the period for which support
is sought.12 Thus a court will ordinarily be applying its own law when ordering
the delinquent parent to support his family, because the test of the applicable law
is the presence of the obligor.
The last sentence of section 454.070 was added "to take care of the cases
where the obligee does not know the whereabouts of the obligor or where the
obligor defaults or simply has property subject to the jurisdiction of the court."' ,,
It provides that: "The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding
state during the period for which support is sought until otherwise shown."14 Certainly, however, no obligor can complain that such a rebuttable presumption deprives him of a constitutional right, when, indeed, he has the privilege of choosing
for his future residence a state with a law favorable to him.15
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

301 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Mo. 1957).
Brockelbank, supra note 5, at 2.
§ 454.070, RSMo 1957 Supp.
§§ 454.040-.070, RSMo 1957 Supp.
§ 454.070, RSMo 1959.

BROCKELBANK, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT 28 (1960).
14. § 454.070, RSMo 1959.
15. For an argument to the effect that this change makes certain states

13.

"Nevadas of support," see Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognization of Support
Duties, 42 CALIF. L. Rnv. 382, 388 (1954). But cf. BROCKELBANK, INTERSTATE
ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT 28 (1960).
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It might be asked whether the act is unconstitutional because of indefiniteness. One author has written that since the act "creates no new offenses, and employs no vague and indefinite terms lacking a standard of application," it cannot
be questioned on this score simply because it has omitted details of procedure. 16
This issue was not raised in the Ivey case.1 7 However, in State ex rel. Schwartz v.
Buder,18 prohibition was brought to restrain a circuit court from hearing a cross-bill
for divorce filed by the husband in a proceeding brought under the Uniform Support of Dependents Law. In holding that the act provided clearly and definitely
for the procedure to be followed, the court said:
Chapter 454 is unquestionably a special procedure statute.
All of the civil provisions of the chapter relate to adjudging and collecting the support money for the dependents. The act provides that the
action be initiated in the state of the family or dependents and sent to the
courts of the state where the husband resides. The court of the responding
state is then required under Section 454.120, V.A.M.S., to do the five following things: "(1) Docket the cause; (2) Notify the prosecuting attorney; (3) Set a time and place for hearing not less than ten days nor
more than thirty days; (4) Serve upon the obligor copy of said copies at
least five days before the day set for hearing; (5) Hear evidence, submitted by petitioner and obligor and make and render such orders and
judgments as the court adjudges should be made under the provisions of
this act or dischzarge the obligor."

The Act makes various provisions for the civil enforcement of support, even to providing for the arrest of the husband under certain conditions. Sec. 454.115, V.A.M.S. It is therefore completely devoted to the
sole question of compelling support. It provides the special procedure ....2Thus, at least the St. Louis Court of Appeals considered the procedure
sufficiently definite, considering the limited scope of the act.
In a California support proceeding a similar contention was urged by a husband whose wife had obtained an ex parte divorce decree that gave her custody
of their child.20 The husband contended that since there had never been a prior
16. Brockelbank, supra note 5, at 12. For the omitted details of procedure, see
Harmon v. Harmon, 160 Cal. App. 2d 47, 324 P.2d 901 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1958)
(definition of duty of support); Pousson v. Superior Court, 165 Cal. App. 2d 750,
332 P.2d 766 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (responding state to obtain jurisdiction of
defendant or his property); Whittlesey v. Bellah, 130 Cal. App. 2d 182, 278 P.2d
511 (2d Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955), and Lambrou v. Berna,
154 Me. 353, 148 A.2d 697 (1959) (no provision for cross examination); Allain v.
Allain, 24 Ill. App. 2d 400, 164 N.E.2d 611 (1960) (no provision for notice to defendant of hearing in the initiating state); Duncan v. Smith, 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1953) (no definition of court or petitioners representative); Kirby v.
Kirby, 338 Mass. 263, 155 N.E.2d 165 (1959), (initiating state makes a finding that
a duty of support may be owed, and that responding court may obtain jurisdiction
of defendant); State ex rel. Schwartz v. Buder, 315 S.W.2d 867 (St. L. Ct. App.
1958) (counterclaim on a collateral issue); Ex parte Helms, 152 Tex. 480, 259
S.W.2d 184 (1953) (allowance of attorney's fees).
17. Ivey v. Ayers, supra note 7.
18. 315 S.W.2d 867 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958),
19. Id. at 869.
20. Harmon v. Harmon, 160 Cal. App. 2d 47, 324 P.2d 901 (2d Dist. Ct. App.
1958).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/8
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court order regarding support, the duty of support as defined in the act was so
vague and indefinite that "men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning." 21 The court held that section 1653(1), defining duty of support as including
"any duty of support imposed or imposa'ble by law, or by any court order, decree
or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding for
divorce, judicial separation, separation maintenance or otherwise," 22 and section
1670, which provided that "duties of support enforceable under this title are
those imposed or imposable under the laws of any state where the alleged obligor
was present during the period for which support is sought or where the obligee
was present when the failure to support commenced, at the election of the
obligee," 23 were not so vague and indefinite as to be unconstitutional 2 4
In Duncan v. Smith,25 a Kentucky case, the reference in the act to the
"court" and "personal representative" of the responding state was held to mean
the "appropriate courts and legal officers in other states having a similar law."26
The defendant also contended that it was not clear whether the petitioner's representative was required to act for resident petitioners as well as nonresident petitioners. Although the Uniform Support of Dependents Law was then in force in
Kentucky,27 the holding that the personal representative "has the duty to act
'in every proceeding pursuant to this chapter,' which would include proceedings instituted both by residents and nonresidents"28 would appear to be the proper interpretation of the same language in the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
9

Support Act.2

Two other constitutional objections often raised are that the act violates the
due process clauses of both the federal and state constitutions in that there is
no requirement of notice to the obligor of the proceeding before the court in the
initiating state, and that the defendant is not afforded an opportunity to crossexamine the obligee concerning matters contained in her testimony before the
foreign state court and offered as evidence against him.30 Both of these objections
appear to have been settled in Missouri by the Ivey case.3 '
In that case the divorced wife, residing in Virginia, filed her petition in the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Richmond, Virginia, alleging that the
defendant was the father of her ten year old son, that he had failed to provide
21. Id. at 905.
22. CAL. CIVIL PROC. CODE § 1653(1).
23. CAL. CIVIL PROC. CODE § 1670.
24. Harmon v. Harmon, supra note 20, at 52, 324 P.2d at 905.
25. 262 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953).
26. Id. at 376.
27. Ky. REV. STAT. § 407.100 (1960).
28. Duncan v. Smith, supra note 25, at 376.
29. § 454.020, RSMo 1959. For authority that the two acts are intended
serve the same purpose and should be granted reciprocal operation see Smith
Smith, 131 Cal. App. 2d 764, 281 P.2d 274 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Hodges
Hodges, 108 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1951); Commonwealth ex rel. Shaffer
Shaffer, supra note 3.
30. Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d "768, 777 (1955).

to
v.
v.
v.

31. Ivey v. Ayers, suzpra note 7.
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support for the son for the past five years, that the support needs of the son
amounted to fifteen dollars per week, and that the defendant resided in Macon

County, Missouri. To the defendant's objection that neither the Missouri nor the
Virginia act required notice to be given him of the Virginia proceeding, the court
answered that the simple filing of the petition did not result in any adverse judgment or action taken against the defendant. The court also held that the findings
of the Virginia court "constitute no more than recommendations to the court of
the responding state, and the final decision and the only judgment to be made
must be by the court of the responding state."32 The action of the Virginia court
merely enabled the petitioner to submit her claim without the necessity of her
personal presence. The court further observed that this situation is no more a
denial of due process than where there is no required notice "to a defendant that
an ordinary civil suit is to be filed against him in the circuit court of the county
in which he resides.' '
The act does not contemplate an initial adversary type hearing.34 Nor does
it contemplate personal service on the defendant in the state where the suit is
commenced. 5 The court's actions in the initiating state are confined to finding
probable cause, viz., an ex parte determination by the court that the allegations
warrant further proceedings and that the defendant or his property may be within
the responding state's jurisdiction.36 Thus, since the findings of the court in the
initiating state constitute only recommendations, and since it acts merely to enable
the obligee to submit her claim against the defendant, without the necessity of
her personal presence, to the jurisdiction of the court of the responding state, due
37
process does not require notice to be given to the defendant.
Other courts have generally held that the finding of the initiating court is
in no way evidentiary as to defendant's liability. 38 Therefore, the determination
of a duty to support can be made only by the court having personal jurisdiction
°
over the defendant,3 9 on evidence presented before it.4
The defendant in the Ivey case also contended that he was deprived of due
process "because he was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the plaintiff
concerning matters contained in her testimony taken before the court in Virginia
and offered as evidence in the proceeding in the Missouri court." 41 The court

32. Supra note 7, at 796.
33. Ibid.
34. Aflain v. Allain, supra note 16, at 406, 164 N.E.2d at 616.
35. Allain v. Allain, supra note 16, at 406, 164 N.E2d at 615; Dean v. Dodge,
220 Ark. 853, 857, 250 S.W.2d 731, 733 (1952).
36. Kirby v. Kirby, supra note 16, at 269, 155 N.E.2d at 169.
37. Dean v. Dodge, supra note 35; Allain v. Allain, supra note 16; Rosenburg
v. Rosenburg, 152 Me. 161, 125 A.2d 863 (1956); Mahan v. Read, 240 N.C. 641,
83 S.E.2d 706 (1954).
38. E.g., Pfueller v. Pfueller, 37 N.J. Super. 106, 108, 117 A.2d 30, 32 (App.
Div. 1955).
39. Lyons v. Lyons, 75 Nev. 495, 346 P.2d 709 (1959).
40. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 231 La. 638, 647, 92 So. 2d 393, 396 (1956).
41. Ivey v. Ayers, supra note 17, at 796.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol27/iss3/8
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answered simply that the Missouri act does not require such testimony to be introduced as evidence or even considered by the Missouri court.
Section 454.120(5) requires no more than that the court of the responding state shall hear evidence submitted to it by the plaintiff and defendant,
and Section 454.190 requires that the court shall be bound by the same
rules of evidence as are used in circuit courts. The offer, or even the erroneous acceptance of improper evidence does not result in the invalidity
of the act under which the proceeding is being held on the basis that
there is a denial of due process of law. The acceptance of improper evidence is a matter to be corrected on appeal. Neither the Missouri or
Virginia Act requires notice to defendant of the proceedings before the
court of the initiating state, and we therefore need not decide if the testimony of the plaintiff taken before the Virginia court would be admissible
in the court in Missouri if notice to defendant was required and given.
The testimony of plaintiff in the Virginia court which was offered as evidence in the Missouri court was taken ex parte, and in view of the requirements of Section 454.190, it has no more legal effect when offered
42
in the Missouri court than an affidavit.
Other courts have pointed out that, even though the plaintiff is not personally
before the court, the defendant may protect himself from false allegations in the
petition by cross-examining the petitioner through depositions or interrogatories." 8
The trial court, however, must be cautioned not to treat the findings of the
initiating court as evidence, unless admitted by the defendant. Clearly the act
contemplates that the court "will properly evaluate the proof as to the child's
necessities with the ability of the father to pay, and with a judicial discretion that
will not penalize the father for not having been able to cross-examine the mother." 44
In Duncan v. Smitk45 it was contended that the provision of the act requiring
the county attorney, "a public official, to represent 'private persons in private
lawsuits,' constitutes a diversion of public funds for the benefit of private individuals."4 1 This argument was based on the Kentucky Constitution, which provides
that taxes shall be levied and collected for public purposes only.47 The court held
that providing the services of the county attorney for one who cannot afford
private counsel is substantially the same as paying public funds to needy individuals. In fact, it should be less expensive for the state to provide free legal service
than to support the needy dependents.
The act has also been challenged on the ground that it is extra-territorial in
its application. The contention usually made is that the act purports to give the
enacting state's courts jurisdiction outside of the state and other state courts jurisdiction in the enacting state. To use an example, if a petition is filed in a Mis42. Ibid.
43. Whittlesey v. Bellah, supra note 16; Smith v. Smith, supra note 29; Lambrou v. Berna, supra note 16.
44. Whittlesey v. Bellah, supra note 16, at 185, 278 P.2d at 513.
45. Supra note 25.
46. Supra note 25, at 377.
47. Ky. CONST. § 171. The Missouri Constitution, article X, section 3, contains
substantially the same provision.
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souri court on behalf of a dependent child, and sent to the court in a Kansas
county where the father is living, the Missouri court is allegedly taking personal
jurisdiction over a Kansas resident. In reality, however, the Missouri court is
merely serving as a local agency of convenience for the Kansas court. The Kansas
court will have personal jurisdiction over the father and will enforce only a duty
of support imposed by the law of Kansas.4s While the Kansas court may not have
complete technical jurisdiction over the plaintiff in Missouri, "from a practical
standpoint it has such jurisdiction over the petitioner as to enable the court to
make a binding determination of the petitioner's rights, or to compel the petitioner to meet certain requirements as a condition of being granted the relief
sought."40
The granting of free legal representation to a dependent person when the
obligor is in another state but denying such representation when the obligor is in
the same state has been attacked as granting a special privilege. The Kentucky
court, in the Duncan case, felt the practical difficulties involved in a dependent's
securing support from a person residing in another state constituted a valid basis
for granting the free legal representation in the one case and denying it in the
other.5 0 It would also seem that helping compel the father-husband to support his
dependents is in furtherance of the general welfare of the public and not merely
for the benefit of the dependent.
Although not all the constitutional objections have been passed on by the
Missouri courts, it appears that, based on the Ivey case and the decisions of other
courts, there is no valid constitutional objection of any type apparent on the face
of the present act.
B. Construction
Section 454.090 provides that "all duties of support are enforceable by action
irrespective of the relationship between the obligor and obligee." 5'1 This provision
accomplishes two objectives. First, it overturns the ancient common law principle
that one spouse could not sue the other and that a child could not sue its parent.
Second, all duties of support, whether statutory or common law, become enforceable in one uniform proceeding. Section 454.020 defines duty of support as including "any duty of support imposed or imposable by law, or any court order, decree
or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to a proceeding
for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance or otherwise."s2 It was intended that any enforceable duty of support would be within the purview of the
act, both as to amounts in arrears and as to amounts owed currently or in the
future.63

It is generally held that since the act is remedial in nature it should be
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Duncan v. Smith, supra note 25, at 377,
Ibid.
Duncan v. Smith, supra note 25, at 378.
§ 454.090, RSMo 1959.
§ 454.020(6), RSMo 1959.

53. BROCKELBANK, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SuPPoRT 34 (1960).
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liberally construed.5 4 It is remedial because its primary purpose is to provide
better enforcement of the obligation to support children and wives who have been
deserted by the husband or father, and thereby promote and advance the public
welfare 5r However, after all reasonable doubts have been resolved in favor of the
applicability of the statute in a particular case, the interpretation must not be
inconsistent with the language of the act.56
The Missouri courts have followed the general policy of liberally construing
the act. In State ex Tel. Watley v. Maeller,57 the ex-wife was seeking 4,125 dollars
for accrued support due her under a separation agreement and an order for
future support for their two children. The defendant argued that the divorce
decree did not order him to make any support payments to the wife or their
children and that the plaintiff had no court order, judgment or decree requiring
him to make any payments to her. Prior to the divorce the defendant had entered
into a separation agreement with the plaintiff in which he gave custody of the
children to the plaintiff and promised to make certain support payments to her.
The subsequent divorce decree adopted the agreement and ordered the parties
to abide by it. The problem before the court was whether the divorce decree was
sufficiently final and complete so that the parties could tell with reasonable certainty the extent to which their rights were fixed. The court held that the judgment was sufficient to impose a duty of support as contemplated by the Uniform
Act, either on the theory that the separation agreement, which was filed in the
divorce court with the pleadings, could be referred to, or that the agreement was
incorporated by reference in the divorce decree. 58 The agreement also provided
that after one of the children reached majority, either the parties would agree
on the amount to be paid for the support of the younger child, or that a court
would adjudicate the question. This was also held not to render the judgment
invalid, for the agreement provided for all contingencies.5"
Frequently there are disagreements as to what duties of support are enforceable. To carry out the purpose of the act, ie., to provide support for distressed dependents, the language of the act that "any duty of support is enforceable" should
be read literally. Thus, even where there has been no prior adjudication or agreement
of the duty to support, recovery may be had for past support furnished by the
wife60 But if the purpose of the act will not be effectuated by a literal reading of
the statute, the court will likely find a different construction of the language.
Where a Missouri court had granted a divorce decree and ordered 75 dol54. Illinois ex rel. Shannon v. Sterling, 248 Minn. 266, 80 N.W.2d 13 (1956).
55. State ex rel. Whatley v. Mueller, 288 S.W.2d 405, 409 (St. L. Ct. App.
1956).
56. Id., citing State ex rel. Brown v. Board of Educ., 294 Mo. 106, 242
S.W. 85 (1922) (en banc).
57. Sutpra note 55.
58. Accord, Smith v. Smith, sunpra note 29; Daly v. Daly, 21 N.J. 599, 123
A.2d 3 (1956); Commonwealth ex rel. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 175 Pa. Super. 100, 103
A.2d 430 (1956).
59. State ex rel. Whatley v. Mueller, supra note 55, at 411.
60. Skinner v. Fascians, 165 Ohio St. 390, 137 N.E.2d 613 (1956).
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lars per month support for the two children of the marriage and later increased
the support order to 150 dollars per month, in a hearing where the defendant was
unable to appear except by counsel, the New Jersey court allowed the defendant
five months to seek a modification of the Missouri order.61 Although the modified
order was thought to be too high, the court felt that it could not modify it in the
absence of special circumstances. Thus, the defendant's only remedy was to appear
before the Missouri court and ask for a modification of the judgment. But, as if
to recommend a modification to the Missouri court, the New Jersey decree was
for 150 dollars per month, with leave to the defendant to pay only 130 dollars
per month for five months, during which time he could petition the Missouri
court for a reduction of the support order.62
Absent the Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, a problem may arise if
there is in existence a prior order of support. If the prior support order was
rendered in another state, the traditional procedures for enforcing such an order
have been described as "intolerable."' 63 Since the full faith and credit clause requires only that a final money judgment be honored, 4 a support order rendered
in a sister state will not be enforced as a local decree because most divorce and
support orders are non-modifiable only as to past due installments.6i In this situation the obligee must wait until sufficient payments have accrued to make it
worthwhile for her to go to the obligor's state where she can obtain personal
jurisdiction and bring a suit at law. Add to this the fact that most states will not
permit the obligee to ask for a modification of the order as to future payments, 6
and the "intolerable" description seems justified. The trend, however, now appears
to be to enforce a foreign support decree with leave to the obligor to ask for a
67
modification of the order if there has been a change of circumstances.
The act has been fairly successful in meeting this problem. If the responding
state determines that a duty of support exists under its laws, it may order the
obligor to pay support, either in the amount of the foreign order or a different
amount.68 But if the judgment is not shown to be final and non-modifiable as to
past due installments, some courts will not enforce collection of such payments.
In the Coumans case, the New Jersey court refused to grant the judgment full
faith and credit until the Missouri court made the order final and non-modifiable.
This situation prompted the Committee on Reciprocal Enforcement of Support to
report in 1958 that:
61. Coumans v. Albaugh, 36 N.J. Super. 308, 115 A.2d 641 (Juv. and Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1955).
62. Ibid.
63. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS OF LAW 258 (1959).
64. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
65. Ives v. Ives, 247 Ala. 689, 26 So. 2d 92 (1946); Stilley v. Stilley, 219 Ark.
813, 244 S.W.2d 958 (1952); Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. 118, 174 N.E. 206
(1931).
66. Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941); Espeland v.
Espeland, 111 Mont. 365, 109 P.2d 792 (1941).
67. Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283 P.2d 19 (1955); 20 MONT.L.

REY. 874, 878 (1959); 1956 WASH. U.L.Q. 246.
68. Coumans v. Albaugh, s.tpra note 61.
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Experience has shown that many courts have interpreted the act to include only actions for current support. This has been true despite constant efforts of the Council of State Governments and the chairman of
your committee to call attention to Section 2(f), 6 9 which defines duty
of support as that "imposed or imposable by law, or by any court order,
decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether incidental to
a proceeding for divorce, legal separation, separate maintenance or other0
wise."7

It has been suggested that the theory of the commissioners was that past due
installments are as much a duty of support as future installments and should be
enforced7' There still remains the argument, however, that where the support
order was not entered in the responding state the order is of no special interest
to that state and should not be enforceable under principles of conflict of laws.2
In a well reasoned decision, the California Supreme Court held that the act
has rejected this doctrine and that in a suit pursuant to the act, a court not only
must "recognize and enforce foreign alimony and support decrees whether modifiable or not," but also "must afford the defendant an opportunity to litigate the
issue of modification."73 If the court in such a case modifies the decree and enters
a judgment for a liquidated sum for the past due installments, the judgment is
final and is thereafter entitled to full faith and credit in any state.7 4 As to future
installments, the order is enforceable as long as the circumstances remain unchanged.75 The dissenting judge in the California case felt that the act does not
require that a foreign retroactively modifiable decree be enforced. In his opinion
the act provides merely that the court make an initial determination of the amount
of support owed and give credit for any amount paid under the foreign order.7 6
Prior to this case, California courts had enforced prospectively modifiable
orders as they stood, until they were modified in the rendering state.7 7 Today, however, it is generally conceded that although the court is not constitutionally bound
to enforce a modifiable order,78 neither is it forbidden from enforcing one.79 In
fact, the Supreme Court recently has refused to say whether or not a modifiable
judgment must be given full faith and credit.8 0 In the instant case the California
69. § 454.020(b), RSMo 1959.

70.

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS.

REPORT

TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT

ACT

4 (1958).
71. Kelso, Reciprocal Enforcement of Support: 1958 Dimensions, 43 MINN. L.
REv. 875, 881 (1959).
72. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 458, comment a (1934).
73. Worthley v. Worthley, supra note 67, at 471, 283 P.2d at 24.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Worthley v. Worthley, supra note 67, at 473, 283 P.2d at 26 (dissenting
opinion).
77. Biewend v. Biewend, supra note 66, at 112, 109 P.2d at 704.
78. Sistare v. Sistare supra note 64; Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 186

(1858).
79. State ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1946).
80. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 234 (1946); Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S.

77, 81 (194).
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court felt that by enforcing the modifiable decree, with leave to the defendant to
litigate the question of modification, it would be serving the best interests of the
parties. Thus neither party would be required to return to the state of rendition
to seek a modification of the order, nor would a plaintiff living away from the
rendering state have to return to that state and reduce her claim to a money
judgment in order to collect back support money.
Furthermore, there is no merit to the contention that as a matter of
practical convenience the issue of modification should be tried in the
courts of the state where the support decree was originally rendered.
Proof of changed circumstances in support cases is no more difficult than
in custody cases and . . . a California court that has jurisdiction of the

subject matter must undertake to adjudicate a plea for modification of
custody rights established by a sister-state decree. .

.

. Moreover, in most

states the problem of modification is dealt with according to general
equitable principles, and the law of the state in which the support obligation originated can be judicially noticed. ....
.1

Another situation that often arises is one in which a divorce decree is granted
in one state and an action is brought at a later time in another state for support
of dependent children. If there was no mention of child support in the original
decree, a court in the second state may properly grant a support order.82 If there
was an award of support in the divorce decree, the defendant may be ordered to
pay additional support. 85 But, although the results of the decisions in this area
are generally in agreement, the theories upon which they are grounded differ.
In a recent Illinois case the defendant affirmatively pleaded compliance with the
support provisions of a Minnesota divorce decree.8 4 On appeal the defendant
argued that because the Minnesota decree should be given full faith and credit,
the court could not order additional support without finding a change in circumstances. The Illinois court conceded that the decree should be entitled to full
faith and credit, even though it might be modifiable as to future installments. It
was that court's view, however, that a grant of additional support did not constitute a modification or change of the provisions of a foreign divorce decree awarding child support. In granting additional support, the court looked only to see
whether the defendant was providing reasonable support for his dependents, taking into account any amount of support money which the defendant might be
paying under the Minnesota decree. An Iowa court, on the other hand, recognized
that there is authority for holding that a responding court either may or may not
enter a new order of support, but apparently dissatisfied with the prior arguments
for either position, examined several provisions of the act and concluded that "a
reasonable interpretation of the act fairly shows that it was intended to give an
additional remedy, in the application of which the respondent court might make
81. Worthley v. Worthley, supra note 67, at 474, 283 P.2d at 25.
82. Hartshorn v. Hartshorn, 21 Ill. App. 2d 91, 157 N.E.2d 563 (1959).
83. Despain v. Despain, 78 Idaho 185, 300 P.2d 500 (1957); Allain v. Allain,
24 Ill. App. 2d 400, 161 N.E.2d 611 (1960).
84. Allain v. Allain, .upra.
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its own determination of the needs of the petitioning party and make such order
as justice might require." 5 Other courts have reached the same result by finding
that the foreign support order was not entitled to full faith and credit, thus leaving the court free to decree whatever support it thought proper under the circumstances.88
Can the responding court modify a foreign support decree without a showing
of changed circumstances? At least one court has held that it can.8r This, however,
is contrary to the established view that a foreign support decree is entitled to full
faith and credit and is therefore res judicata, wnless there has been such a change
in circumstances that the rendering court would modify the decree. 88 Thus, to
modify the decree without a change in circumstances is, in effect, holding that the
foreign decree is not entitled to full faith and credit. In support of this approach
it may be said that, in ordering support, a court should be concerned only with
what is a fair and reasonable sum for support in that state, and not with what was
thought reasonable by another court under different support laws.8 9 However, in
view of the weight of authority that foreign support orders are entitled to full
faith and credit,90 it is at least questionable whether other courts will adopt this
reasoning.
A father may not by contract relieve himself of his duty to support minor
children. Thus, a divorce decree incorporating a separation agreement providing
that the wife should provide the sole support for their children can not be a bar
to a suit for support of the dependent child.91 Similarly, where an obligor is
85. Moore v. Moore, 107 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 1961); noted in 47 IowA L. REv.

173 (1961).
86. Potter v. Potter, 131 Colo. 14, 278 P.2d 1020 (1955). Jennings v. Howard,
56 F. Supp. 193 (E.D. Mo. 1944), indicates that the Missouri courts will give full
faith and credit to a foreign support order. Whether they will adopt the liberal
rule of the Worthley case and allow the defendant to litigate the issue of modification whenever a foreign support order is sought to be enforced against him remains to be seen. It would seem that they should.
87. Allain v. Allain, supra note 83.
88. Coumans v. Albaugh, supra note 61.
89. Bachman v. Mejias, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 136 N.E.2d 866
(1956); Benedict v. Benedict, 203 Misc. 286, 115 N.Y.S.2d 352 (Dom. Rel. Ct.
1952). But see, Whittlesey v. Bellah, 130 Cal. App. 2d 182, 278 P.2d 511 (2d Dist.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 821 (1955).
90. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290
U.S. 202 (1933).
91. In Barfield v. Harrison, 101 Ga. App. 497, 114 S.E.2d 302 (1960), the
mother initiated suit in Virginia against the father in Georgia, for support of their
minor child. The father pleaded a separation agreement, later incorporated into a
divorce decree, which provided that the mother should have permanent custody
and that she would "support, maintain, educate, and care for the child." 101 Ga.
App. at 498, 114 S.E.2d at 303. The court held that under the act "a father
continues liable for support of his children and no decree made since the effective
date of such act for the support of children, entered in any divorce proceeding is a
final and unalterable adjudication precluding a later adjustment. . .

."

Ibid. In

Smittk v. Smitk an alleged agreement relieving the father of the duty of supporting
his daughter was held to be of no effect. "A parent may not by any act, conduct,
or arrangement of whatever sort shift from his shoulders the legal responsibility
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1962
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ordered to make support payments in addition to those which he is already paying
under a foreign support decree, such order does not modify the original decree. 92
Thus the obligee may recover unpaid past installments of a divorce decree even
though the obligor is presently complying with a support decree rendered in a suit
93
under the Uniform Act.
What if, after a separate maintenance order is issued, the husband obtains
an ex parte divorce in which no mention of alimony or support is made? It seems
clear that the duty to support the wife survives the divorce, as the court does not
have jurisdiction over the wife and cannot terminate her right to support. 94
Apparently, then, the original separate maintenance decree can be enforced, but
leave should be granted to both parties to litigate the issue of modification.95
The jurisdiction obtained pursuant to this act does not confer jurisdiction upon the court to permit a counterclaim for divorce, separation or annulment.98 To
allow such a counterclaim would be to "compel a mother, claiming support for
her children, to defend such divorce action in a place far removed from her
7
domicile."
To prevent defeat of the expeditious character of the act, Missouri, in 1959,
adopted section 454.270. It provides that no proceeding brought under the act
"shall be stayed because of the existence of a pending action for divorce, separation, annulment, dissolution, habeas corpus or custody proceeding.!" Otherwise,
the dilatory acts of the defendant or a crowded court docket could delay a much
needed support order. Before this provision was adopted in 1959, the St. Louis Court
of Appeals had held that the Buchanan County Circuit Court, which had granted
a divorce and support decree, had exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the
children's support and maintenance and that a St. Louis county circuit court
did not have jurisdiction to issue a support order in favor of the plaintiff then
living in Iowa. 9 The plaintiff relied on section 454.030, which provides that "the
remedies herein provided are in addition to and not in substitution for any other
remedies."' 00 The court held that the purpose of the act, including section 454.030,
was to preserve to the wife all remedies available to her before, plus those provided
for in the act. It was said, however, that
and moral duty to support his minor child. It is an absolute, inalienable right
enjoyed by the child which no form of contract between the parents, nor change
of the domestic status of either of them, may effect." 125 Cal. App. 2d 154, 164,
270 P.2d 613, 621 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1954). Accord, Smith v. Smith, 131 Cal.
App. 2d 764, 281 P.2d 274 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Laws v. People, 59 Colo.
562, 151 Pac. 433 (1915).
92. Section 454.030, RSMo 1959, provides: "The remedies herein provided are
in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies."
93. Despain v. Despain, s-pra note 83.
94. Gohdes v. Gohdes, 134 Cal. App. 2d 819, 286 P.2d 539 (4th Dist. Ct. App.
1955).
95. Worthley v. Worthley, supra note 67.
96. State ex rel. Schwartz v. Buder, 315 S.W.2d 867 (St. L. Ct. App. 1958).
97. Id. at 870.
98. § 454.270, RSMo 1959.
99. Welch v. McIntosh, 290 S.W.2d 181 (St. L. Ct. App. 1956).
100. § 454.090, RSMo 1959.
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it certainly was not contemplated that a plaintiff, after having availed herself of the remedies provided by the divorce statutes of this state, could
thereafter proceed in a court of concurrent jurisdiction in this state to
enforce the same rights involved in the first action. Such a construction
of the Act would result in confusion and be violative of the well settled
principle that a court should not take jurisdiction of a matter which is properly involved in a proceeding pending in another court of concurrent
jurisdiction1Ol
Since section 454.270 was enacted after the case was decided, it is not clear
whether the statute has superseded the doctrine of the case. If the court meant to
restrict its holding to the situation where another court of the state has granted
a divorce and support decree to the parties and has retained jurisdiction over the
case, the amendment probably did not, even though it should, supersede the
decision. But, if the holding is broad enough to include the situation where an
action is pending in another court of the state, the amendment does supersede
the case. The language quoted from the case seems to indicate that the latter situation was to be included.
It is submitted that the act should be applicable in both situations. Otherwise
the defendant can defeat the purpose of the act by moving to a distant part of the
same state that previously issued a support decree.
What seems to be the proper result has been reached by the Florida Supreme
Court102 In that case the wife obtained a Florida divorce in county A, and subsequently moved to Connecticut. The husband moved to county B and became
delinquent in his support payments. When the wife proceeded under the act to
have the support decree enforced in county B, the circuit court dismissed the
petition, saying that the divorcing court was the proper forum to enforce the
decree. The supreme court reversed, finding that:
[T]here is no difference, in principle, in enforcing the duty of support decreed by a sister state and in enforcing the duty when decreed by a court
of this state, especially since it appears to be the duty of support imposed
by a divorce or separate maintenance decree (as distinguished from the
amount of the support so decreed) that is enforced by the responding
state under the Act in question.1° 3
It should be noted, however, that even if the court of defendant's residence
is permitted to take jurisdiction of the suit, the decree sought to be enforced is a
"local" decree, with full effect throughout the state. Thus, whether the court can
modify the "local" decree seems questionable.104
III. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT

Sections 454.050 and 454.060105 provide for the extradition of a resident of
Missouri charged with the crime of non-support in another state. The first section
101. Welch v. McIntosh, supra note 99, at 184.
102. Thompson v. Thompson, 93 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1957).
103. Id. at 93.
104. Briggs, Need for Adoption of 1958 Amendment to tle Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act, 20 MONT. L. REv. 40, 43-44 (1958).

105. §§ 454.050,.060, RSMo 1959.
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provides that the Governor of Missouri may demand the return to this state of a
person charged with the crime of failure of support, or that he mnay surrender such
a person to another demanding state. The last two sentences of that section read:
The provisions for extradition of criminals not inconsistent herewith shall
apply to any such demand although the person whose surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state at the time of the commission of
the crime and although he had not fled therefrom. Neither the demand,
the oath nor any proceedings for extradition pursuant to this section need
state or show that the person whose surrender is demanded has fled
from justice, or at the time of the commission of the crime was in the
demanding or other state.108
Professor Brockelbank has suggested that this portion of the statute is of special
significance, because:
These free the extradition procedure from the necessity of stating or showing that the person whose surrender is demanded was in the demanding
07
state at the time of the commission of the crime or had fled therefrom.3
They are especially desirable in all cases of desertion and non support.
Without them it would be necessary to show that the defendant, before
leaving the demanding state, had deserted and had already formulated an
intention not to support his family. In most cases this is either not true
or impossible to prove. It is rare that a man's intention is clear. Frequently
he may leave the state with little or no intention other than to seek work,
and only after the emotional ties to his family have been loosened does
he determine to desert and not to support them. Thus these provisions
become almost indispensable in the support cases.108
The validity of the criminal provisions of the act has not been passed upon
by an appellate court in Missouri. It has elsewhere been upheld against the objection that a father who has merely failed to provide for support of his dependents
in another state is not a fugitive who has committed an act in the demanding
state which would authorize his extradition. 10 9 This is because the duty to sup106. § 454.050, RSMo 1959.
107. Professor Brockelbank at this point listed the following footnote:
8. These provisions were inspired by the non-general text of Section
6 of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act which has been adopted in
forty states. The latter Act has been held constitutional in Ex parte
Morgan, 78 F. Supp. 756 (S.D. Cal. 1948); State ex rel. Giddar v. Kriss,
191 Md. 568 (1948); People ex rel. Faulds v. Herberich, 93 N.Y.S.2d
272 (2d Dep't 1948), aff'd 301 N.Y. 614, 93 N.E.2d 913 (1949); Cubbertson v. Sweeney, 70 Ohio App. 344, 44 N.E.2d 807 (1942), Appeal dismissed, 140 Ohio St. 426, 45 N.E.2d 118 (1942); English v. Matomitz,
148 Ohio St. 39, 72 N.E.2d 898 (1947); In re Action, 90 Ohio App. 100,
103 N.E.2d 577 (1949); Ex parte Dalton, 56 N.M. 407, 244 P.2d 790
(1952); Ex parte Bledsoe, 93 Okla. Crim. App. 302, 227 P.2d 680 (1951);
Ex parte Coleman, 245 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Cr. 1952) ...
108. Brockelbank, Relief From Extradition Under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 19 Mo. L. REv. 191, 192 (1954). For a contrary view as
to the wisdom of providing for extradition, see 37 N.D.L. REV. 423, 425 (1961).
109. Harrison v. State, 38 Ala. 60, 77 So. 2d 384 (1955); Matthews v. People,
136 Colo. 102, 314 P.2d 906 (1956); In re Harris, 170 Ohio St. 151, 163 N.E.2d
762 (1960).
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port one's minor children exists universally, and the mere failure to do so constitutes a crime."10 In finding the necessary criminal element to support an extradition order, one court fairly expressed the general attitude of the courts toward a
non-supporting father when it said that "when the law requires one to act, e.g.,
to support his children, his willful failure to do so is as much an act, albeit an act
of omission, as if he literally took food from their mouths or physically carried
them from shelter and left them abandoned and unsheltered. '11'
By the same token, the defendant need never have been in the demanding
state; it is sufficient if he has constructively committed a crime there by failing
to provide support. For example, in Harrison v. State" 2 the defendant had gone
to Tennessee in 1953, married his wife, and returned to Alabama. The Alabama
court held that the defendant was not entitled to be released on a writ of habeas
corpus even though he had not been in Tennessee at any time since the child was
born. In so holding, the court noted that Alabama may, in the exercise of its
sovereign powers and as an act of comity to Tennessee, provide by the Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act for the surrender of a person indictable for a crime
committed through his constructive presence in Tennessee, even though he was
not in Tennessee when the duty to support the child arose and had not fled therefrom to escape arrest and punishment. Thus the authority to extradite a person
for the crime of non-support, even though he was not present in the demanding
state at the time of the commission of the crime charged, and has not fled therefrom, is valid and enforceable.
The question might arise as to whether the Uniform Extradition Law,
adopted in 1953 by the General Assembly, 18 repeals that portion of section
454.050114 which provides that the defendant need not have fled from the demanding state. The Extradition Law states that the defendant must have been
"present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime.""15 Another section, however, provides that the defendant is subject to
extradition even though he was not present in the demanding state, if he
intentionally committed an act that resulted in a crime in that state."1 6 A Texas
court solved this problem by holding that the legislative intent indicated "that
extradition in non-child-support cases was to be governed by the provisions of
the Support Act in so far as presence of the accused in the demanding state was
concerned rather than by the provision of the Extradition Act relative thereto.""17
In effect, then, it was held that the Extradition Act did not repeal the Support Act.
This appears to be the proper result.
To the contention that the obligor has not "intentionally" failed to provide
support, it may be answered that whether it was willful or intentional goes to the
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

In re Harris, supra.
In re Harris, supra note 109, at 158, 163 N.E.2d at 768.
Supra note 109.
§§ 548.011-.300, RSMo 1959.
§ 454.050, RSMo 1959.
§ 548.031, RSMo 1959.
§ 548.061, RSMo 1959.
Ex parte Coleman, 157 Tex. Crim. 37, 40, 245 S.W.2d 712, 715 (1951).
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merits of the charge, and should not be inquired into by the state of the obligor's
residence.118
The second section dealing with criminal sanctions was repealed in 1959, and
a completely new section was adopted. 119 The old section had been construed by
two courts as allowing an obligor to relieve himself from extradition by initiating
an ex parte support proceeding before a court in the responding state.120 Two
other courts reached a more desirable result by construing the same section to
mean that the obligor must be complying with a support order initiated by the
obligee.121 The interpretation of the two former courts would allow the recalcitrant
obligor to purchase his freedom by untruthfully informing the judge as to either
his ability to pay or as to the obligee's needs. The latter courts are insuring that
they will hear both sides of the story. In any event, the present provision (if
adopted) would appear to leave no doubt that the obligor cannot defeat extradi1 22
tion by instituting his own support proceeding.
The obligor is not left without protection, however. The Governor of Missouri need not demand extradition of an obligor from another state until sixty days
after the obligee has brought a support action, unless it can be shown that it would
be useless to bring such an action.123 When a demand is made on the Governor of
Missouri for the surrender of a person living in Missouri, extradition may be delayed by the Governor until he is satisfied that a suit for support has been brought,
or that it would be useless to bring one, or that an action was brought but that
118. Harrison v. State, supra note 109; Ex parte Gilbreath, 311 S.W.2d 851
(Tex. Crim. App. 1958). Contra, Matthews v. People, 136 Colo. 102, 314 P.2d
906 (1957).
119. § 454.060, RSMo 1957 Supp. (old); § 454.060, RSMo 1959 (new).
120. Jackson v. Hall, 97 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957); Lefler v. Lefler, 218 Ore. 231,
344 P.2d 754 (1959).
121. Ex parte Floyd, 43 Cal. 2d 379, 273 P.2d 820 (1954); Sands v. Sands, 136
N.E.2d 747 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
Professor Brockelbank reports that Missouri, in response to a questionnaire
sent out by the Council of State Governments, has expressed the attitude that
an extradition request should not be honored unless the civil remedy under the
reciprocal procedure has first been attempted, or unless the obligor has violated
an enforceable order entered in the demanding state. Brockelbank, supra note 108,
at 18 n.30.
122. For a general discussion of criminal enforcement under the act, see
Brockelbank, Relief from Extradition Under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act, 19 Mo. L. REv. 191 (1954).
The practice of allowing an ex parte support order in the responding state has
been critized by Professor Brockelbank as being unwise and unconstitutional. He
contends that it is unwise "because it permits an obligor to purchase a cheap immunity from extradition and to the same extent it short changes the destitute
family." BROCKELBANK, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT 20 (1960).
In other words, the court is not apt to get accurate information from the obligor,
either because he is dishonest, or because he is uninformed. It is said to be unconstitutional because to determine the amount of support owed to the absent obligee
"without notice . . . and an opportunity to be heard is a violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' Id. at 22. For a contrary view, see
37 N.D.L. REv. 423, 425 (1961).
123. § 454.060(1), RSMo 1959.
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the obligor prevailed in the action."24 Also, if an action for support has been
brought and the obligor is complying with that order, any demand for extradi125
tion may be denied.
IV.

REGISTRATION

In 1959 the Missouri legislature amended the act to provide for the registration
26
and enforcement of foreign support orders.' Now an obligee may register a foreign
127
a verified petition
support order by filing in the state of defendant's residence
setting forth the amount remaining unpaid and a list of states in which the order
is registered. 128 The obligee must also attach to the petition a certified copy of
29
the support order which includes any modifications thereof.1 After obtaining
jurisdiction over the obligor or his property the court may confirm the order; or,
if the obligor appears, the court may adjudicate the issues, including the matter
of amounts remaining unpaid.12 0 The obligor may assert any defenses available to
13
confirmed, it
any defendant in an action on a foreign judgment. ' If the order 13is
2
state.
confirming
the
in
entered
originally
if
as
effect
same
the
has
It has been suggested that the new registration procedure furnishes a method
of avoiding any controversy which might otherwise arise if arrearages were sought

124. § 454.060(3), (4), RSMo 1959.
125. § 454.060(5), RSMo 1959.
126. Section 454.300, RSMo 1959: "The obligee may register the foreign support order in a court of this state in the manner, with the effect and for the purposes herein provided."
Section 454.310, RSMo 1959: "The clerk of the court shall maintain a Registry
of Foreign Support Orders in which he shall file foreign support orders."
Section 454.320, RSMo 1959: "The petition for registration shall be verified
and shall set forth the amount remaining unpaid and a list of any other states in
which the support order is registered and shall have attached to it a certified copy
of the support order with all modifications thereof. The foreign support order is
registered upon the filing of the petition subject only to the subsequent order of
confirmation."
Section 454.330, RSMo 1959: "The procedure to obtain jurisdiction of the
person or property of the obligor shall be as provided in civil cases. The obligor may
assert any defenses available to a defendant in an action on a foreign judgment.
If the obligor defaults, the court shall enter an order confirming the registered
support order and determining the amounts remaining unpaid. If the obligor
appears and a hearing is held, the court shall adjudicate the issues including the
amounts remaining unpaid."
Section 454.340, RSMo 1959: "The support order as confirmed shall have the
same effect and may be enforced as if originally entered in the court of this state.
The procedures for the enforcement thereof shall be as in civil cases."
127. Of course, the foreign decree may be registered in a state where the
obligor has property subject to attachment, if the obligee is willing and desires
to proceed in an in rem action to collect for support.
128. § 454.030, RSMo 1959.
129. § 454.030, RSMo 1959.
130. § 454.330, RSMo 1959.
131. § 454.330, RSMo 1959.
132. § 454.340, RSMo 1959.
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to be collected.133 If the obligor or his property is in another state when the divorce
or support decree is rendered, registration of that decree in the foreign state will
give the obligee a local judgment, so that any unpaid installments will immediately
become debts. The same procedure should be followed with regard to any modification of the decree.
There are no reported cases construing this portion of the act, but there
seem to be several inherent problems that may arise.
If the obligee registers the decree in another state for the purpose of collecting
past due installments, the obligor might contend that the "registered" support
order has the effect of being rendered on the date of confirmation by the registering court. Thus, only payments accruing thereafter could be collected. As one
author has stated, however:
[In as much as the general policy for aid in interpreting the act evidenced
throughout the act is the protection of obligees, and [sections 454.300340 were] designed to better that protection, the phrase "originally
entered"' 3 ' should be interpreted as relating back to the date the order was
5
entered in the state where it was originally entered13
The obligor might also contend, if his state of residence refuses to enforce
modifiable foreign support orders, that since he may assert "any defense available
to a defendant in an action on a foreign judgment,"136 he should be able to assert
the same defense to the registration of the judgment. However, to protect the
policy of the act, it must be assumed that the drafters intended that registration
be available in all states, regardless of a state's policy as to enforcing modifiable
foreign orders. Thus, only the following defenses, which go to the validity of the
judgment, should be allowed: (1) that in the original action the court lacked
jurisdiction; (2) payment; (3) satisfaction or release of the original support order;
(4) the statute of limitations; and (5) fraud in obtaining the original order.3 7
A recent Illinois case allowed the registration of a modifiable Missouri divorce
and support decree. 138 Although the decree was registered under the Illinois Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act,13 9 that act and the registration provisions
of the Support Act are so similar in language and purpose that a court should give
the same effect to both. In holding that the lower court erred in failing to register
the Missouri decree as an Illinois judgment as to future payments, the Illinois

court stated:
Policy considerations argue strongly that such decrees are entitled to full
faith and credit. Unless they receive interstate recognition, the insulated
133. Kelso, Reciprocal Enforcement of Support: 1958 Dimensions, 43 MINN.
L. REv. 875, 883 (1959). See also notes 63-90 supra and accompanying text.
134. § 454.030, RSMo 1959.
135. Kelso, supra note 133.
136. § 454.330, RSMo 1959.
137. Kelso, supra note 133, at 884. E.g., Weiler v. Weiler, 331 S.W.2d 165
(K.C. Ct. App. 1956) (divorce suit, allowing the husband to show the wife's fraud
in obtaining a prior Illinois divorce).
138. Light v. Light, 12 Ill. 2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1957).
139. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 77, §§ 88-105 (1959). See § 511.760, RSMo-1959.
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judicial systems of the several states may become sanctuaries within
which obligations that have been fully and fairly adjudicated in another
jurisdiction may be escaped. These policy considerations have found expression in the decisions of many State courts which, on the grounds of
comity, have given full effect, including equitable enforcement, to foreign
decrees awarding alimony in the future' 40
The question as to whether a registering court will allow the judgment to be
modified during the registration proceeding also remains undecided. It appears
that since the foreign decree becomes a local decree upon registration,141 it should
be treated as if originally rendered by the registering court, and a later action for
modification by either party should be allowed. However, it would be much
simplier and less expensive if the decree could be modified at the time it is
registered. Even though the act provides only that the support order and a statement of the amounts remaining unpaid accompany the request for registration,
this would not appear to foreclose the possibility of the obligee including in her
petition for registration a statement of change in circumstances entitling her to an
upward modification of the support order. Likewise, since the decree will now be
a local decree, the obligor should be allowed to assert a change in circumstances
entitling him to a reduction in support payments.
Professor Kelso, in contending that the registering court should allow the issue
of modification to be litigated in a registration proceeding, has stated:
If the registering state adopts the view of Worthiey that in an action to
enforce a foreign judgment the parties may develop the modification
issue, modification downward would be a type of defense available to the
defendant in an action on a modifiable support judgment-a defense
which Worthiey assumes is constitutionally indicated. As to modifications
upward, since in order to permit registration the registering state will have
jurisdiction over the obligor or his property, there is no constitutional objection to permitting the obligee to join with the petition for registration
a petition for modification upward. The court could then consolidate the
two matters, hear evidence pertaining both to defenses on the judgment
and to modification, confirm the judgment, including amounts unpaid, then
modify the judgment and order the obligor to comply with the judgment
as modified. This would carry forward the purposes of the act and is well
42
within the procedural flexibility of equity.1
An advantage of using the registration procedure rather than the ordinary
two-state proceeding to enforce a duty of support is that the registered judgment,
being a local judgment rendered with jurisdiction over both parties, should be res
judicata in other states. This result is foreclosed in the two-state procedure by
section 454.280, which provides:
No order of support issued by a court of this state when acting as a
responding state shall supersede any other order of support but the

140. Light v. Light, supra note 138, at 510, 147 N.E.2d at 39.
141. Mangold v. Mangold, 294 S.W.2d 368 (K.C. Ct. App. 1956).
142. Kelso, supra note 133, at 885.
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